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Abstract
We study the problem of finding a universal (image-agnostic) perturbation to fool
machine learning (ML) classifiers (e.g., neural nets, decision tress) in the hard-label
black-box setting. Recent work in adversarial ML in the white-box setting (model
parameters are known) has shown that many state-of-the-art image classifiers are
vulnerable to universal adversarial perturbations: a fixed human-imperceptible
perturbation that, when added to any image, causes it to be misclassified with
high probability Kurakin et al. [2016], Szegedy et al. [2013], Chen et al. [2017a],
Carlini and Wagner [2017]. This paper considers a more practical and challenging
problem of finding such universal perturbations in an obscure (or black-box)
setting. More specifically, we use zeroth order optimization algorithms to find such
a universal adversarial perturbation when no model information is revealed-except
that the attacker can make queries to probe the classifier. We further relax the
assumption that the output of a query is continuous valued confidence scores for
all the classes and consider the case where the output is a hard-label decision.
Surprisingly, we found that even in these extremely obscure regimes, state-of-the-
art ML classifiers can be fooled with a very high probability just by adding a single
human-imperceptible image perturbation to any natural image. The surprising
existence of universal perturbations in a hard-label (or decision-based) black-box
setting raises serious security concerns with the existence of a universal noise
vector that adversaries can possibly exploit to break a classifier on most natural
images.
1 Introduction
Despite the remarkable success of machine learning approaches, especially deep neural networks
(DNNs), in image classification, a series of results Cheng et al. [2018], Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [2016,
2015], Szegedy et al. [2013], Goodfellow et al. [2014] has raised concerns regarding their utility in
safety-critical applications. Attackers can design human-imperceptible perturbations which when
added to almost any natural image result in their misclassification. This perturbation design problem
is usually posed as an optimization problem: given a fixed classifier f and a correctly classified image
xi, find a noise vector i of minimal norm, such that, f(xi) 6= f(xi + i).
There are a couple of issues with most of the current approaches developed to solve the above
formulation. Most approaches assume a “white-box" setting where the adversary has a complete
knowledge of the ML model parameters. In such a setting, the gradient of the attack objective function
can be computed by back-propagation, and the perturbation design problem can be solved quite
easily. However, in many practical applications, model parameters (or internal design architecture) are
inaccessible to the user Bhagoji et al. [2018] and only queries can be made to obtain the corresponding
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outputs of the model (e.g., probability score, hard label (or top-1 predicted class), etc.). This gives rise
to Security through obscurity (STO) defense paradigm. STO is a process of implementing security
within a system by enforcing secrecy and confidentiality of the system’s internal design architecture.
STO aims to secure a system by deliberately hiding or concealing its security flaws Van Oorschot
[2003]. Interestingly, some recent works have shown that even in such a “black-box" setting, it
is possible to fool the ML classifier with a high probability Chen et al. [2017b], Papernot et al.
[2017], Bhagoji et al. [2017], Liu et al. [2018], Tu et al. [2018]. These black-box attacks can be
broadly classified in two categories: 1) knowledge transfer based attacks, and, 2) zeroth-order
optimization based attacks. In knowledge transfer based attacks, instead of attacking the original
model f , attackers try to construct a substitute model fˆ to mimic f and then attack it using existing
white-box attack methods Papernot et al. [2017], Bhagoji et al. [2017]. However, it was shown
recently that these approaches usually leads to much larger distortion and low success rate of attack
transfer Chen et al. [2017b]. To overcome this limitation, zeroth-order optimization based attacks are
devised which can be directly applied to minimize a suitable loss function for f using derivative-free
optimization or black-box optimization methods Chen et al. [2017b], Liu et al. [2018]. In particular,
Chen et al. [2017b] considered the problem of score-based black-box setting, where attackers can
query the softmax layer output in addition to the final classification result. In this case, it is possible
to reconstruct the original loss function and use a zeroth order optimization approach to optimize
it. Most relevant to our work, the authors in Brendel et al. [2017], Cheng et al. [2018] considered a
hard-label black-box setting which refers to cases where real-world ML systems only provide limited
prediction results of an input query. Specifically, only the final decision (top-1 predicted label) instead
of probability outputs is known to an attacker.
However, compared to white-box attacks, all the black-box attacks discussed above are very compu-
tationally expensive (require millions of queries). Furthermore, these approaches are intrinsically
dependent on the individual images: the perturbations are specifically crafted for each image in-
dependently. As a result, the computation of an adversarial perturbation for a new image requires
solving an image-dependent optimization problem from scratch, making their applicability in practice
infeasible1. This practical limitation gives us an impression that Security through obscurity (STO)
defense may still be a viable solution. To evaluate this hypothesis, this paper considers the problem of
finding a Universal Adversarial Perturbation- a vector  which can be added to any image to fool the
classifier with high probability, in a hard-label back-box setting. Such an  would eliminate the need
to recompute a new perturbation for each input. Note that the hard-label black-box setting is very
challenging as it requires minimizing a non-continuous step function, which is combinatorial and
cannot be solved by a gradient-based optimizer. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We show the existence of universal adversarial perturbations for ML classifiers in a hard-
label black-box setting (breaking the STO defense).
• We reformulate the attack as an easy to solve continuous-valued optimization problem and
propose a zeroth-order optimization algorithm for finding such perturbations.
• Experimental validations are performed on CIFAR10 dataset.
2 Universal Hard-Label Black-Box Attacks
We formalize in this section the notion of universal perturbations in a hard-label black-box setting, and
propose a method for finding such perturbations. For simplicity, let us consider attacking a K-way
multi-class classification model in this paper, i.e., f : Rd → [K]. Finding a universal adversarial
perturbation can be posed as a stochastic optimization problem: find  of minimal norm such that
Px∈N (f(x+ ) 6= f(x)) ≥ p, (1)
where N is the set of natural images. The main focus of this paper is to design approaches to find
an image-agnostic minimal norm (or quasi-imperceptible) perturbation vector  ∈ Rd that fool the
classifier f on almost all images sampled from N with only hard-labeled queries from f . The main
challenge now is to solve (1) with only hard-labeled queries to f .
1There are some efforts on designing image-agnostic universal perturbation, however, are limited to the
“white-box" setting Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [2016], Poursaeed et al. [2017], Perolat et al. [2018], Brown et al.
[2017], Mopuri et al. [2018].
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Note that the optimization problem (1) is extremely difficult to approach directly. Not only is the
gradient with respect to  unavailable, but also the loss function ( indicator function of the set of 
satisfying equation (1)) is discontinuous. Furthermore, the loss function cannot be evaluated directly,
and can only be estimated with empirical sampling. To overcome this challenge, we next introduce
an auxiliary function which is much easier to optimize. Furthermore, we show that to optimize (1), it
suffices to optimize the auxiliary function.
2.1 A Universal Auxiliary Function
Now we re-formulate universal hard-label black-box attack as another easier to optimize problem by
defining a universal auxiliary objective function. Later we will discuss how to evaluate the function
value using hard-label queries, and then apply a zeroth order optimization algorithm to obtain a
universal adversarial perturbation.
Let us consider the set of natural imagesN in the ambient space Rd, where each x ∈ N has true label
f(x) ∈ [K], and the hard-label black-box function f : Rd → [K]. Following a similar approach as
given in Cheng et al. [2018], we define our new objective function2 as:
h(θ, p) = argminλ>0(Px∈N (f(x+ λ
θ
‖θ‖ ) 6= f(x)) ≥ p). (2)
In this formulation, θ represents the universal search direction and h(θ, p) is the distance from N to
the nearest universal adversarial perturbation along the direction θ. In this formulation, instead of
directly searching for a universal perturbation , we search for the universal direction θ to minimize
the distortion h(θ, p), which leads to the following optimization problem:
θ∗ := minθh(θ, p), (3)
and in this case the universal perturbation vector and adversarial examples are given by
 = h(θ∗, p)
θ∗
‖θ∗‖ , and x
∗
i = xi + . (4)
Note that unlike white-box objective functions, which are discontinuous step functions in the hard-
label setting, h(θ, p) maps input direction to real-valued output (distance to decision boundary), which
is usually a continuous function. This makes it easy to apply zeroth-order optimization methods to
solve universal perturbation design problem. In the absence of the knowledge of the image generating
distribution, the most natural choice is to empirically estimate h as follows: take a sample set of N
images x1, . . . ,xN and define
hˆ(θ) = argminλ>0(f(xi + λ
θ
‖θ‖ ) 6= f(xi),∀i ∈ [N ]). (5)
In other words, hˆ(θ) is defined as the minimal perturbation distance in direction θ so that all N
images are misclassified.
2.2 Algorithms to Find Universal Perturbation
Even with our new auxiliary function h defined, we cannot evaluate the gradient of h due to the
black-box nature of the problem. However, now we can evaluate the function values of h (which are
continuous) using the hard-label queries to the original classifier function f . This procedure is used
to find the initial θ0 and corresponding hˆ(θ0) in our optimization algorithm. For a given normalized
θ, we do a fine-grained search and then a binary search similar to Cheng et al. [2018]. We omit the
detailed algorithm for this part since it is similar to Algorithm 1.
In practice, the optimization of
hˆ(θ) = argminλ>0(f(xi + λ
θ
‖θ‖ ) 6= f(xi),∀i ∈ [N ])
2Note that under the manifold hypothesis h is continuous almost everywhere, and is therefore amenable to
zeroth-order optimization methods.
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Algorithm 1 Compute hˆ(θ) locally
Input: Hard-label model f , original image label pairs {(x1, y1), . . . (xN , yN )}, query direction θ,
previous value v, increase/decrease ratio α = 0.01, stopping tolerance  (maximum tolerance of
computed error)
θ ← θ/‖θ‖
if f(xi + vθ) = yi for some i ∈ [N ] then
vleft ← v, vright ← (1 + α)
while f(xi + vrightθ) = yi for some i ∈ [N ] do
vright ← (1 + α)vright
end while
else
vright ← v, vleft ← (1− α)v
while f(xi + vleftθ) 6= yi for all i ∈ [N ] do
vleft ← (1− α)vleft
end while
end if
## Binary search within [vleft, vright]
while vright − vleft >  do
vmid ← (vright + vleft)/2
if f(xi + vmidθ) = yi for some i ∈ [N ] then
vleft → vmid
else
vright → vmid
end if
return vright
end while
Algorithm 2 RGF for universal hard-label black-box attack (See also Cheng et al. [2018])
Input: Hard-label model f , original image label pairs {(x1, y1), . . . (xN , yN )}, initial θ0.
for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T do
Randomly choose ut from a zero-mean Gaussian distribution
Evaluate hˆ(θt) and hˆ(θt + βu) using Algorithm 1
Compute hˆ′ = hˆ(θt+βu)−hˆ(θt)β u
θt+1 ← θt − νthˆ′
end for
return x0 + hˆ(θT )θT
turns out to be difficult to minimize. Therefore, in our implementation, we consider a couple of
variants of hˆ as discussed next next. First, we consider a norm based approximation:
hˆn(θ) = ‖(hˆ(θ,x1), . . . , hˆ(θ,xN ))‖p (6)
where hˆ(θ,xi) is obtained by applying hˆ on a single image i (instead of a set of images {1, · · · , N}).
We call such an attack a “NormAttack", as we are trying to minimize the p norm of a vector with
h(θ,xi) in each component. Next, we consider a stochastic approximation hˆp as given below:
hˆp(θ, p) = argminλ>0(f(xi + λ
θ
‖θ‖ ) 6= f(xi), for at least p×N of i in [N ]. (7)
We refer to this attack as the “ProbAttack" as it aims to find the minimal perturbation needed to fool
a proportion p of the training samples.
Given hˆn and hˆp, to solve the universal adversarial perturbation design problem for which we can
only evaluate function value instead of gradient, zeroth-order optimization algorithms can be naturally
applied. In this paper, we use Randomized Gradient-Free (RGF) method proposed in Balasubramanian
and Ghadimi [2018] as our zeroth-order algorithm. In each iteration, the gradient of function h is
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Figure 1: Success rate of universal adversarial perturbations at various scales on 1000 random images
from CIFAR-10 dataset. The relative distortion is L2 norm of perturbation divided by average norm
of CIFAR-10 image. Since CIFAR-10 has only 10 image classes, 90% success rate is optimal for
untargeted attack as it indicates that the classifier is essentially returning a random prediction.
estimated by
hˆ′ =
hˆ(θt + βu)− hˆ(θt)
β
u
where u is a random Gaussian vector, and β > 0 is a smoothing parameter.
3 Experimental Results
We test the performance of our universal hard-label black-box attack algorithms on convolutional
neural network (CNN) models. We validate our approach on CIFAR-10 dataset. The network model
used is as follows: four convolution layers, two max-pooling layers and two fully-connected layers.
Using the parameters provided by Carlini and Wagner [2017], we could achieve 82.5% accuracy on
CIFAR-10. All models are trained using Pytorch and our source code will be publicly available soon.
3.1 Breaking the STO Defense
In the first experiment, we analyze the robustness of deep neural network classifiers to black-box
universal perturbations found using Algorithm 2 on CIFAR dataset. Specifically, we report the fooling
ratio, that is the proportion of images that change labels when perturbed by our black-box universal
perturbation. It can be seen from Fig. 1 that Algorithm 2 can find quasi-imperceptible perturbations
which can fool DNN classifiers with a very high probability. Specifically, “NormAttack" based
black-box universal perturbation achieves high fooling/success rate with very small distortion. By
increasing the magnitude of the distortion, we can achieve 100% success rate as in “white-box"
attacks. We also show corresponding perturbed images for visual inspection of quasi-imperceptibility
in Fig 2. These results show that even without accessing the model parameters, an adversary can fool
DNN classifiers with only relying on hard-label queries to the black-box. As a consequence, STO
based defenses are not robust for ML applications.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed the existence of hard-label black-box universal perturbations that can fool
state-of-the-art classifiers on natural images. We proposed an iterative algorithm to generate universal
perturbations without accessing the model parameters. In particular, we showed that these universal
perturbations can be easily found using hard-labeled queries to ML black-box models, thereby,
breaking the security through obscurity based defenses. Currently, we are devising techniques to
utilize gradient information from white-box models (or knowledge transfer) to minimize the query-
complexity of finding such hard-label black-box universal perturbations. Also, we plan to show that
these universal perturbations generalize very well across different ML models resulting in doubly-
universal perturbations (image-agnostic, network-agnostic). A theoretical analysis of existence of
black-box universal perturbations will be the subject of future research.
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Figure 2: Bottom row is perturbation scaled to various relative distortion levels. Other rows show
perturbation applied to various images in CIFAR-10 images and predicted class.
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